Brigham Young University International Law & Management
Review
Volume 5 | Issue 1

Article 6

12-20-2008

International Data Privacy lawws and the Protectors
of Privacy
ILMR Editors

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr
Part of the Databases and Information Systems Commons, International Law Commons, and the
Privacy Law Commons
Recommended Citation
ILMR Editors, International Data Privacy lawws and the Protectors of Privacy, 5 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. R. 173 (2008).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr/vol5/iss1/6

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University International Law & Management Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

International Data Privacy Laws and the
Protectors of Privacy
ILMR Editors*
Abraham L. Newman’s Protectors of Privacy1 provides a stirring
review of past and present international data privacy laws.
Throughout the detailed historical narrative of global privacy laws,
Newman analyzes not only the causes of change that brought about
new laws, but also the effects the laws have had and will have in the
future on individuals, governments, and businesses. His central
theme is how the organization of businesses and politics affects data
privacy laws and regulations—specifically the central role that
intragovernmental and intergovernmental regulatory bodies, the
“protectors of privacy,” play in shaping privacy protection in Europe
and throughout the world.
I. WHY PRIVACY LAWS MATTER
Newman opens his book by discussing how nations and
businesses within those nations regulate vast amounts of personal
information, including social security numbers, credit card purchases,
website history, mobile phone logs, and even biometric data.2 For
example, Wal-Mart must manage its more than 460 terabytes (460
trillion bytes) of customer data—twice as much data as is housed on
the entire Internet.3 Although most nations have established some
sort of data privacy regime under which businesses and governments
operate, those regimes are imperfect. Identity theft and fraud alone
cost U.S. consumers more than $50 billion every year.4
The technological advances allowing for rapid transfer and
inexpensive storage of large amounts of data, coupled with the
increasingly large electronic commerce market,5 exacerbates the data
privacy problem within a state or nation. In addition, these advances
* The ILMR editors responsible for writing and editing this book review include Joshua
Engel, Lorie Hobbs, Parker Morrill, Devin Wagstaff, and Dorothy Hatch Ward. All five are
J.D. candidates, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
1. ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, PROTECTORS OF PRIVACY (2008). The book contains 221
pages (including extensive notes and a bibliography), and the ISBN is 0-8014-4549-3.
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Estimated at $12 trillion in 2006.
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may cause international disputes because of the ease with which
personal information can flow across jurisdictional boundaries.6
While these disputes have frustrated international trade and business,
they have also promoted greater cooperation and compromise
among the world’s superpowers.
Newman states that privacy policies have implications for
individual liberties, the powers of state, and the global economy.7
Individuals should be concerned with the dangers of discrimination,
surveillance, and other potential abuses of their private information.8
Governments should be concerned with trade and security issues,
especially counterterrorism. Businesses should be concerned with
privacy laws as they directly affect the management of client
information, especially that of international clients, when it is
gathered and shared with other businesses and governments. In
particular, privacy laws may have potentially severe consequences for
international trade and outsourcing.9 Rather than being just an
abstract legal concern, Newman says, data privacy laws and
regulations affect “patterns of information exchange: how individuals
express their identity, how companies differentiate markets, and how
governments manage risk.”10
II. COMPREHENSIVE AND LIMITED REGIMES
Newman broadly categorizes data privacy regimes used in various
countries into two groups: comprehensive regimes and limited
regimes. Comprehensive regimes regulate both the public and
private sectors, while limited regimes regulate only the public
sector.11 Newman recognizes the substantial differences in the
implementation of these two regimes but focuses on the general
ideologies to demonstrate how the regimes control data. By
comparing and contrasting comprehensive and limited regimes,
particularly those of the European Union and the United States,
Newman identifies the effects of global politics, the factors that lead
a country toward one regime or the other, and the effect the type of
regime has on international negotiations.
6. Id. at 2, 8.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 47–48.
9. Id. at 3–5.
10. Id. at 6. Although this review will mostly be limited to the effects on businesses, a
large portion of the book deals with effects on governments.
11. Id. at 23.
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Newman suggests that comprehensive regimes limit the
development of business sectors, citing, for example, the lack of a
subprime mortgage market in countries with comprehensive regimes.
He explains that the restrictive data privacy rules prevent lenders
from (1) identifying high-risk clients and (2) providing customized
real estate products.12
Newman finds that businesses in limited regimes rely on selfregulation and market mechanisms to control the use of personal
data. Governments in limited regimes impose some oversight of
certain private sector industries, such as health care and financial
services, but the oversight is limited.13 Personal data in limited
regimes is valuable because, upon agreement, businesses can use
and/or sell that data, especially for marketing purposes and
consumer profiling. Newman notes that the financial services
industry earns $17 billion annually from the free flow of
information.14 The U.S. government is also a major player in the
information market—just four of the many government agencies
purchased roughly $30 million worth of information from data
compilers in 2005.15
Newman compares and contrasts the effects of the regimes on
businesses in the United States and the European Union. Companies
in the United States frequently buy and sell personal information.
Publicly available information can also be gathered and transferred
with minimal restrictions on its use.16 On the other hand, E.U.
countries limit the transfer of personal information, even if obtained
from public registries. Credit reporting agencies are also more
restricted. French credit reporting agencies are public sector
institutions and only provide negative credit information (e.g.,
defaults and bankruptcies). Limiting this profiling under a
comprehensive regime would impose significant costs on U.S.
businesses. The information industry estimates that costs would
increase in excess of $16 billion if a comprehensive regime was put in
place in the United States.17 Without the collection and distribution
of positive financial information concerning potential customers’
spending habits or investment information, businesses would have to
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See id. at 29.
Id. at 30–31.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30.
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adapt their business models and find other ways to focus their
advertising.18
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
After introducing his topic and explaining some general privacy
law principals, Newman begins his lengthy discussion of privacy law
history. He then details the historical origin of privacy regulation in
the European Union, which would come to characterize the privacy
regulation for most of the rest of the world.
A. Early Privacy Laws
Newman posits that data privacy concerns began about the same
time as the arrival of the mainframe computer in the 1970s, when
scholars began discussing the implications of the new technology and
data collection.19 As a result, a set of principles called the Fair
Information Practice Principles was developed and included the right
to be notified before the collection of the information, the right to
consent to the further distribution of the information, and the right
to object to incorrect data.20
Newman observes that the U.S. policy regarding data privacy
began when Congress passed the 1974 Privacy Act.21 Industry
lobbyists quickly pointed out that there had been no problems in the
private sector that warranted comprehensive rules. Furthermore,
U.S. President Gerald Ford threatened to veto any bill that
contained private sector regulation and to further institute public
sector regulation via executive order if Congress did not enact a
limited privacy regime.22 Congress therefore adopted a limited
privacy regulatory regime under pressure from private industry and
the President.23 Eventually the United States became the strongest
proponent of limited data privacy regimes.
B. Creation of Privacy Laws in the European Union
Newman then proceeds to discuss the creation and evolution of
the E.U. privacy regime. In the early 1970s, privacy advocates in
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

176

See id. at 28–29.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 43, 57.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
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Europe worried that countries without privacy regulations would
become havens for large banks of personal information.24 Delegates
from European countries joined forces to find a solution to
increasing international data sharing. For the next ten years, privacy
regulation discussions continued and eventually a group of privacy
experts convened and made recommendations to the Council of
Europe.25 These recommendations were adopted in the Council of
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 1981. Although some
European countries ratified the convention, it was not self-executing
and ultimately failed to produce any comprehensive regulation.26
Although the European Union was, by and large, indifferent and
even resistant to private sector privacy controls in the 1980s, a few
individual countries in Europe did implement private sector privacy
controls. For example, French and German officials overcame
opposition to bureaucratic constraints and adopted privacy rules in
both public and private sectors.27
Newman theorizes that the acceptance of comprehensive privacy
laws in the European Union began in response to concerns about
cross-border data sharing. European countries created a group of
privacy officials to address these concerns.28 As their influence
increased, these officials were able to overcome opposition and
indifference in the European Union. By 1988, eleven European
countries had agencies to address important issues including safe
havens created by countries with lax standards and multi-national
companies engaging in Pan-European data exchange.29
Newman explains that by the late 1980s, conflicts between
European nations concerning data privacy were on the rise. He
notes, in particular, the French data authority blocking the flow of
personal data to both Italy and Belgium in 1989.30 Other conflicts
continued to mount, eventually threatening several European

24. Id. at 83.
25. Id. at 84.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 52. Even though Germany was an early adopter of comprehensive privacy
regulations, Newman rejects the popular belief that countries with fascist histories tended to be
more sensitive to privacy concerns and more likely to adopt a comprehensive regime. See id. at
52–54.
28. Id. at 87.
29. Id. at 87–88.
30. Id. at 89–91.
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Community projects.31
In response to the growing conflicts, the European Community
formed a committee, consisting of national privacy officials and
European Commission officials, to draft a privacy directive to
facilitate uniformity.32 When the draft was released, the industry
lobbyists pushed for flexibility between national regimes because of
the high cost of additional compliance in addition to the capital
already spent on compliance with national rules.33 Finally, in October
1995 the Council of Ministers and the European parliament adopted
the Commission’s resolution.34
Newman explains that the directive required member states to do
three things: enact legislation for the public and private sectors,
create an agency to implement and enforce the directive, and ensure
that countries outside the European Union demonstrate adequate
privacy protection as a condition of data transfers.35 The directive
also created several entities to help the European Union and
individual member states implement the directive’s policies both
inside and outside of the European Union. The directive resulted in
harmonized privacy protection within Europe and gave greater
power to privacy regulators.36
One of the most important parts of the directive for both
European and non-European businesses is Article 25, which requires
European data transfers to be restricted to those countries with
adequate data privacy laws.37 However, rather than imposing a
comprehensive regime across the board, as would normally be
required under Article 25, the United States negotiated the Safe
Harbor Agreement with Europe whereby U.S. businesses may
transfer data from their European affiliates as long as the businesses
comply with E.U. standards. Under the Safe Harbor Agreement,
U.S. firms must choose to be monitored and enforced by selfcertification or self-regulation. Firms that choose to self-regulate
agree to abide by certain dispute resolution requirements and
become subject to the scrutiny of the Federal Trade Commission,
which monitors the firms’ compliance with their self-regulatory
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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Id.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 91–92.
Id. at 93; see also Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).
See id. at 93–94.
Id. at 94–96.
Id. at 36.
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agreements. Firms that choose to self-certify must register with the
European data privacy authority and agree to be regulated by that
agency. A 2004 study showed that seventy-five percent of U.S.
multinational firms chose to self-certify.38 Newman shows that the
European requirements have motivated international businesses to
take the initiative in developing their own internal privacy
regulations and promoting privacy enhancing technology
throughout all of their operations.
IV. THE SPREAD OF PRIVACY LAWS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESSES
Following an extremely detailed narrative of early U.S. and E.U.
data privacy laws, the author next explores how and why the
European Union influenced countries outside of Europe to adopt a
comprehensive privacy policy.39 The author argues that many
countries follow the E.U. pattern because of the influence of its
comprehensive regulatory model for regulating privacy issues, rather
than its sheer market power. Although he does not discuss each
country in detail, Newman notes that since the adoption of the E.U.
regulations “over thirty countries from five continents have moved
toward
adopting
comprehensive
[privacy]
regulations.”40
Furthermore, a number of countries that “previously regulated only
the public sector have adopted private sector legislation.”41
Initially, international resistance to the European Union’s
comprehensive model was strong and vocal. Nonetheless, Newman
argues that the E.U. data privacy authorities came to dominate the
international market as a result of the following four successful policy
mechanisms: “control over market access, E.U. enlargement,
centralized negotiating authority, and oversight networks.”42
A. Controlling Market Access
Newman notes that the European Union’s market size,
combined with its regulatory capacity, allows it to project its rules to
other nations, monitor compliance, and enforce its rules on firms
participating in the European market. The size of the market alone
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 99.
See id. at 101–03.
Id.
Id. at 105.
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might be enough for many firms to adopt E.U. standards because of
the costs of non-adjustment.43
Newman explains that two provisions of the E.U. directive are
central to controlling market access. Article 25 gives authority to ban
transfers of personal information from the European internal market
to nations that fail to enforce adequate privacy protections standards
and levy fines for violations.44 Article 29 confers authority on a
Working Party to determine the adequacy of privacy protection in
other countries, release opinions on such adequacy, make
recommendations, and interpret directives. The determinations and
decisions of the Working Party have an influence on privacy
regulations in other countries.45
As an example of the impact of the European Union’s market
access control, Newman notes that in 1999 the Spanish data privacy
authority investigated a data exchange between Microsoft U.S. and
Microsoft Iberia.46 The Spanish authority determined that Microsoft
acted contrary to European data privacy laws and fined Microsoft
$60,000 for the illegal transfer of Spanish citizens’ personal
information without their consent.47
The author further explains that the European Union used
control of market access to shape regulatory reform in Australia.48
Australia initially adopted a limited privacy regime in 1988.49 Later,
in 1997, despite pressure from the European Union to adopt a
comprehensive privacy scheme, the Australian government ordered
private industry to develop self-regulating standards instead of
expanding privacy regulations. Some industry groups, however,
recognized that Australian self-regulations would have difficulty
meeting the Article 29 adequacy requirements and would therefore
isolate Australian business from the European market.50 Bowing to
these concerns, the Australian government reluctantly enacted
private sector privacy rules. However, even after Australia introduced
comprehensive rules, the Article 29 Working Party deemed the
Australian legislation inadequate and suggested reforms. Yielding to
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
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Id. at 106.
See id. at 111.
Id.
See id. at 106–10.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 106–07.
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pressure from privacy advocates who leveraged the threat of E.U.
sanctions, the Australian government strengthened privacy
regulations to comply with the privacy directive, pending final
European Commission approval.51 Although Australian privacy
regulations are not an exact replica of European rules, market access
control was critical in moving Australia from a limited to a
comprehensive regime.52
Although U.S. companies are not directly subject to the E.U.
privacy regime, they may be forced to comply in order to conduct
business in the European Union. Newman notes that although many
countries have adopted comprehensive privacy policies because of the
European Union’s market access control, the United States has
maintained its limited privacy regime. As mentioned above, however,
in order to comply with the Article 29 Working Party privacy
adequacy requirements, the United States entered into the Safe
Harbor Agreement with Europe.53 Thereby, American firms who
register and agree to the terms of the Safe Harbor Agreement are
able to store and use private data of European citizens.
B. Expansion of the European Union and Its Centralized Negotiation
Authority
To obtain membership in the European Union, prospective
countries must demonstrate that their political, economic, and
regulatory standards comply with E.U. expectations.54 Newman
explains that the European Union uses the allure of prospective E.U.
membership as an incentive for potential E.U. countries to adopt
comprehensive data privacy laws.55 In addition, the European Union
sends experts to candidate countries to monitor and advise on
specific aspects of policy reform and implementation.56 These
requirements are often a bureaucratic barrier to E.U. membership
and do not necessarily benefit businesses. The author found no
evidence that industry groups in the prospective countries promoted
comprehensive privacy legislation.57 Rather, some candidate
countries have succumbed to E.U. peer pressure and passed privacy
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114.
Id.
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legislation initiated through programs funded by an E.U. investment
of over three million Euros.58
The well-developed regulatory capacity of the European Union
allows it to act as a centralized negotiation authority. The European
Union capitalized on this advantage in negotiating the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Initially, privacy rules
banning data transfers to countries that lacked adequate privacy
regulations violated GATS. The European Union pushed for a
privacy exemption, which the United States did not oppose.
However, after the exemption prevailed, the United States realized
that privacy rules could hinder international trade. Unable to weaken
privacy rules because of the GATS exemption, the United States
softened its position in future privacy negotiations with the
European Union.59
C. Oversight Networks
The European expansion of regulatory capacity gives European
regulatory institutions the ability to affect behavior in world markets.
The Article 29 Working Party serves as policymaker by interpreting
privacy laws and recommending privacy policy changes. The
Working Party has released over one hundred opinions, which
although nonbinding, are relied on by national courts as well as
multinational businesses.60
The Working Party opinions have influenced the debate over
online authentication services. For example, following the release of
a nonbinding Working Party opinion addressing its concern with the
lack of disclosure about the use of their consumer information in
online authentication services, Microsoft integrated new privacy
enhancing features into its online authentication service.61 Similarly,
in 2007 the Working Party influenced Google to shorten its data
retention policy from twenty-four months to eighteen months.
Shortly thereafter, Yahoo and Microsoft followed Google’s lead.62
Multinational firms comply with Working Party opinions in
order to avoid litigation or penalties. 63 The changes made by these

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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firms are eventually integrated into their global best practices. 64 The
firms employ professional advisors who bolster the authority of the
Working Party opinions by advising their clients to follow those
opinions.65
The European Union circumvents the need for new legislation
by influencing firms directly through the Working Party opinions.66
Working Party officials can avoid the inefficient institutional
processes of the European Union and “regulat[e] through
recommendation.”67 If multinational firms desire to compete in the
European market, they must integrate the Working Party’s decisions
into their privacy policies, thus demonstrating the European Union’s
powerful ability to define, monitor, and enforce market rules.
Businesses and industries must be aware that regulatory agencies
are exerting a powerful influence on privacy laws and should pay
attention to the trends established by such agencies. Newman
implies that by focusing on the above-mentioned four factors—
control over market access, E.U. enlargement, centralized
negotiating authority, and oversight networks—businesses may be
able to predict the power that a regulatory agency can exert on a
particular industry.
V. CHANGING THE RULES
After explaining the international spread of E.U. privacy laws,
Newman explores the limits of the E.U. regulatory authority in nonmarket settings in view of recent events.68 Newman illustrates some
of these limitations in the telecommunications and national security
debates following terrorist attacks in the United States, Spain, and
the United Kingdom.69 He concludes that in highly sensitive areas,
such as national security, the power of transgovernmental regulatory
bodies diminishes when confronting strong national interests.
However, these regulatory bodies may still have a place in
determining policy within individual countries.70 The compromises

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 121.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 123–24.
69. Id. at 124. See generally id. at 132–139 (discussing the effects of the war on terror
on data privacy).
70. Id. at 125.
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also show that data privacy is not an absolute right, but a freedom
subject to limitation.71
A. The Telecommunications Debate
Newman gives a lengthy description of the fierce debate over
telecommunications data privacy and the qualified victory of E.U.
data privacy authorities in national security disputes.72 While
recognizing that E.U. data privacy authorities modified their initial
proposals, the authorities served as a counterbalance against rules
that would have substantially eliminated privacy rights. In 1997, and
again in 2002, E.U. data privacy authorities in Europe pressed for
regulations that preserved telecommunications data privacy with
minor exceptions for national security.73 For example, data
authorities quickly quashed a Belgian proposal for mandatory data
retention on limited issues.74 It appeared that data privacy advocates
had successfully defended the individual’s right to privacy against
national security concerns with only limited concessions.
However, the terrorist attacks in Spain and the United Kingdom
during 2004 and 2005 shifted the telecommunications data privacy
debate from an E.U. trade issue to a national security issue.75
Ultimately, the European Parliament reached a compromise and
passed legislation providing for the limited retention of
telecommunications data for “between six months and two years.”76
While unsatisfactory, the legislation “limited the use of the retained
data to issues directly related to international criminality.”77 This
compromise appeased the E.U. data privacy authorities, but angered
industry, placing the cost of data retention squarely on industry’s
shoulders.78 Firms were required to maintain data for government
use without reimbursement or the freedom to use the data for their
own marketing or economic benefit.79

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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B. The War on Terror

Newman discusses in detail the conflict of U.S. data retention
laws and E.U. data privacy directives necessitated by terrorist
attacks.80 Although terrorist attacks in Europe prompted a review
and ultimately a reform of E.U. data privacy regulations, the changes
were not as extensive as the reforms made by the United States in
response to the September 11 attacks.81
The gap between the U.S. requirements and the E.U.
regulations resulted in negotiations between the European
Commission and the United States facilitating the exchange of some
sensitive data. However, the negotiations limited which agencies
would have access to the data until a more detailed agreement could
be reached.82 In December 2003, the European Commission
renegotiated a compromise with the United States, but according to
E.U. data privacy authorities and the European Parliament, the
regulations remained inadequate.83 As a result, the European
Parliament filed a suit against the European Commission in the
European Court of Justice, claiming the Commission had
overstepped its authority. The court ruled that because the issue was
one of national security and not “internal trade,” the Commission
violated its authority.84 Following the 2004 ruling, the European
Commission and the United States reached an agreement in 2007
that was less protective of privacy than the prior accord.85
Newman observes that regulatory bodies have strong influence
and power within the narrow scope of their expertise, but are subject
to limitations established by the authorizing statute. Regulatory
bodies lose power and influence when they venture outside of their
expertise or delegated authority.
In the same vein, Newman reminds his readers that the
European Court of Justice and other national courts may yet
influence the future of data privacy by ruling on the constitutionality
of the final 2007 agreement.86 The European Parliament is lobbying
80. See id. at 132–39.
81. Id. at 132–33 (explaining that the United States demanded full access to airline
databases, and a 50 year retention policy, and also threatened heavy-handed penalties backed
by impressive regulatory power and expertise).
82. Id. at 133.
83. Id. at 135.
84. Id. at 136.
85. Id. at 136–37.
86. Id. at 138–39.
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individual parliaments and E.U. data privacy authorities to review the
legality of the act in light of national constitutions and European
laws.87 Additionally, Newman predicts that the decision by the
European Court of Justice will further weaken Europe’s ability to
shape international regulatory debates.88
Recent events have shown the volatility and difficulty of
establishing a global standard for data privacy; therefore businesses
and industry leaders should pay close attention to the negotiations
and proposals that will set the stage for the future. Businesses with
international interests should strongly consider the national and
transgovernmental laws that may affect data use, retention policies,
and even business models of their particular industries.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Throughout the book, Newman notes many implications of his
theories for businesses, individuals, and governments. Although he
only minimally addresses many relevant issues, such as data privacy
concerns in China and India, he does make several observations that
could help businesses, individuals, and governments understand the
importance of maintaining a historical perspective of international
data privacy laws.
Newman perceptively notes that regulation of the international
market is becoming “the next wave of globalization” and recognizes
Europe’s powerful voice in such regulation.89 Although Europe’s
influence in data privacy regulation is strong, the E.U. regulatory
capacity varies considerably across international business issues.90
Due to this variation, Newman encourages scholars to assess E.U.
involvement in international politics and the role of E.U. political
institutions in shaping international governance.91
Newman also observes that the regulatory state has “global
dimensions” and identifies the changing and increasing E.U. role in
international data privacy laws.92 His research shows a turn from
positivist governance towards regulatory strategies in Europe.93
87. Id.
88. Id. at 140.
89. Id. at 15–16.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 14–15.
93. Id. (explaining that in contrast to Europe, which has increasingly granted more and
more authority to regulatory bodies, the United States has shied away from regulatory bodies,
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Newman proposes that his “comparative historical institutional
research” strategy towards data privacy laws should be used to study
other aspects of international law.94
The author compares the effects arising from jurisdictions that
anticipate new issues with jurisdictions that tend towards reactionary
measures—i.e., avoiding regulation until disaster strikes. As
regulatory authorities are not elected and often not closely
scrutinized by legislative bodies, this lack of oversight raises concerns
“about democratic accountability and legitimacy.”95 Newman
illustrates numerous conflicts between limited and comprehensive
privacy law regimes, even among different comprehensive regimes.
Globalization often uncovers conflict of laws between countries, and
there is no supreme authority to determine the proper rule of law.
Compromises, such as the Safe Harbor Agreement, are imperative to
allow multinational firms to conduct business in countries with
conflicting privacy regulations. It has yet to be seen which courts are
better equipped to resolve conflicting laws and determine whether
countries will be bound by decisions of foreign courts. Newman
suggests that continued negotiation, compromise, and judicial review
will determine the boundaries of privacy law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Newman’s book provides businesses with international privacy
concerns an excellent review of past and current privacy laws
throughout the world. The author examines the history of privacy
regulation in striking detail, offers his theory of why privacy laws
developed the way they did, and discusses how these laws may
continue to develop in the near future. Although somewhat limited
in its contemporary application, Newman’s discussion illuminates
several concerns that all businesses with an international clientele
should consider.

viewing them as a form of bureaucracy that unnecessarily interferes with individuals and
businesses).
94. Id. at 17.
95. Id. at 151.
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